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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
AND THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY
BY

1.

WILLIAM

BOONE

LACK OF MUTUALITY AS A REASON FOR DENYING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE

The formulation and general statement of the rule
of mutuality is usually attributed
to Fry on Specific
Performance, although there were some earlier references
to it
in the cases. 1
The original
statement of the rule
by Fry in his first edition in 1848 was:
"A contract,
to be specifically enforced by the court, must be mutual
- that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was
entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties
against the other of them."
In later editions the words
"as a general rule" were inserted after the word "must",
apparently to take care of the numerous exceptions to the
rule as originally stated.2
Some other early text writers stated the rule with some modifications.
Pomeroy,
for example, adding the provisions that the time from
which mutuality was to be determined was when the suit
was begun, and 3 that the contract must still be executory
on both sides.
The view stated by Fry attracted some support because of its plausibility and air of apparent fairness.
The suit for specific performance being in equity, the
court should not render any decree which would not be
just to all the parties.
The unreasonableness of the
doctrine formulated by Fry, however, is
easily
demonstrated.
Why should the outcome of the plaintiff's case
be determined by the possible results of a hypothetical
converse case?
As one court put it:
"The court has no
occasion to anticipate culpable conduct on plaintiff's
part and to speculate on how the defendant might protect
himself should he sometime need protection." 4
Furthermore, it should be noted that the rule of so-called
"negative mutuality" takes no account of whether the
defendant will have an adequate remedy at law if, after
his compelled performance, the plaintiff refuses to
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remedy to a
damages would be an adequate
If
perform.
defendant in such a case, no reason is seen for denying
a plaintiff equitable relief simply because the defenFairness to the defendant does
dant could not have it.
not require that he be entitled to the identical remedy
which is
available
to the
other
party,
but
only that
some kind, or that
defendant
have an adequate remedy of
he be protected
in
some way from the consequences of
plaintiff's breach of
the
contract.
The result
of
the
the rule is a manifest injustice to the plaintiff,
where, assuming that all other conditions necessary to
entitle
him to equitable
relief
are
present,
he is
deprived
of
his
only adequate remedy for
the
sake of- a
syllogistic sort of consistency.
Even if
the
defendent
would have no adequate remedy at law in case of the
plaintiff's breach, and could not get specific enforcement of the contract in equity because it would be impossible or impractical to compel the plaintiff T s performance, it still does not necessarily follow that the
plaintiff's bill should be dismissed out of fairness to
the
defendant.
As will
be pointed
out
later,
there
are
several
means by which an equity court can protect a
defendant in such a case.
Apart from considerations of the fallacy and injustice of Fry's rule of mutuality, an examination of
the decisions reveals very little judicial support for
the doctrine.
In Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 370,
it is pointed out that there are at least eight or nine
situations in which the rule is ignored and the courts
give one party specific performance,
although the other
could not have that remedy.-5
These cases have sometimes been referred to as presenting "exceptions" to
the general rule, but an examination of them will show
that the so-called exceptions eat up the general rule,
leaving it to apply only in a few instances, and in a
few courts where the "exceptions" are not recognized.
As illustrative of the unsoundness of Fry's doctrine is the case where a contract is voidable because
of the fraud of one party to it.
That the defrauded
party is entitled to specific enforcement of the tontract, if it is otherwise appropriate for equitable
relief, is well established, although the culpable
party could not have enforced the contract either at
law or in
equity,
and, hence,
there
was neither
mutuality
of
obligation
nor of
remedy.
5 - See also Willisten on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, Sections 1434 through
1440, Walsh on Equity, Pages 345 through 347.

title
to
who has an incomplete
land
The vendor of
that which he contracted to convey may be compelled to
perform, although the defect is such that he could not
have enforced the vendee's performance. 6
And, conversely, the seller may have specific performance even though,
at the time of the execution of the contract, he had no
title to the land he agreed to convey, so that it would
have been impossible
for
the vendee to have specifically
enforced the contract, provided that the vendee has not
learned of the vendor's lack of title and already rescinded
the
agreement. 7
The granting of specific performance to a party
to a contract who has not satisfied the Statute of Frauds
is another example of an "exception" to the mutuality
rule.
An agreement signed by the defendant may be enforced against him, in spite of the fact that the same
contract could not be sued on by the defendant because
the plaintiff 'did not sign it.
It is said that the
plaintiff,
by filing
his
bill,
submits himself
to the
jurisdiction of the court and enables it to give a degree compelling him as well as the defendant to perform.
An infant may have specific performance in his
favor when he has reached majority 8 or has fully executed the contract on his part, 9 although up to that
time both
mutuality
of remedy and of obligation
were
lacking.
If the infant brings suit before one of these
conditions occurs, his action will be dismissed, not
because of the lack of mutuality of -emedy, as was suggested by an early English decision 1 0 on which Fry's
doctrine was partly based, but because the action and
decree would not bind the minor.
The court can not
deprive the infant of his privilege to disaffirm the
contract, and unless he is deprived of it, the adult
is subjected to injustice if compelled to perform.
In the case of a unilateral contract, the promisee, after performing the act stipulated for, may
compel performance by the promiser,
where equitable
relief is otherwise appropriate, notwithstanding the
6 - Moore v. Goregliette, 228 Ill. 143.
7Gibson v. Brown, 214 Ill. 330; Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407.
There are a
few cases which blindly follow Fry's rule of mutuality, for example, Ten Eyck
v. Manning, 52 N.J. Eq. 47.

8

- Clayton v. Ashdown, 9 Vin Abr. 393.
9 - Asberry v. Mitchell, 121 Va. 276.
10 - Flight v. Bolland, 4. Russ. 298.

fact that the promisee, having of course made no promise, can be forced to do nothing.
Similarly, a party who has fully executed his
part
of a bilateral
contract, specific
.enforcement of
which could not have been given because of the nature
of the acts required by it,
may nevertheless have a
decree enforcing the other party's
promise of the plaintiff
has no adequate remedy at law, and equitable jurisdiction is otherwise appropriate. 11
The assignee of a contract may have specific performance thereof against the other contracting party,
even in a jurisdiction Where the rule is that the assignee,by the mere fact
of acceptance of the assignment,
does not undertake the obligations
of the contract, and
hence, the agreement could not be enforced against such
assignee, either at law or in equity. 12
It is said
"the assignee, by the very act of invoking the aid of
equity, assumes the duty of performance, and subjects
himself to any conditions of the judgment appropriate
thereto. "'

The fact that a State enjoys an exemption from
suits against it without its consent is held not to be
a bar to the State's action for equitable relief against
the other contracting party.
Without further multiplication of examples, it is
believed that it sufficiently appears that the rule requiring mutuality of remedy as a condition to maintenance of an action for specific
performance, as announced
by Fry, is contrary to actual law.
"If ever there was a
rule that mutuality of remedy existing, not merely at
the time of a decree, but at the time of the formation
of the contract, is
a condition of equitable relief,
it
has been so qualified
by exceptions that,
viewed as a
precept of general validity,
it
has ceased to be a rule
today.
What equity exacts today as a condition of relief
is
the assurance that the decree, if
rendered, will
operate without injustice or oppression either to the
plaintiff
or to the defendant."
This statement by
Cardozo, J., in Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, at
11 - O'Reagan v. White, 2 Ir. R. 339.
12 - Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490. That the assignee would not be liable on the
contract otherwise in New York, see Langel v. Betz, 250 N.Y. 159.
13 - Epstein v. Gluckin, supra, note 12, by Cardozo, J.

Page 494, has been generally approved by legal writers
on the subject, 14 and has been quoted by other courts.
The Restatement of Contracts adds its support to this
view; in Section 372(1) the rule of mutuality is expressly
disapproved,
and in
Section
373 the true
rule
is
stated
as follows:
"Specific
enforcement may properly
be refused
if
a substantial
part
of
the agreed exchange for
the performance to be compelled is
as yet
unperformed
and its
concurrent
or future
performance is
not well secured to the satisfaction of the court."
This rule, although somewhat more specific than that
pronounced by Cardozo, has the desired flexibility.
When the party
seeking
specific
performance has fully
performed, or is tendering complete performance, clearly the relief should be granted.
Where the contract is
still executory on both sides, the court may still give
specific performance, if, as in the ordinary case, performance is to be concurrent, such that the decree will
not
bind
the defendant
if the plaintiff fails to perform,
or if the court is satisfied that the person seeking relief will continue to perform.
This latter may be shown
by past conduct, or the plaintiff may have such a strong
economic interest in the carrying out of the contract by
reason of extensive investment of funds and labor that
his default is highly improbable. 16 Where there does not
appear sufficient assurance that the plaintiff will perform his part of the contract, so that the decree might
operate unfairly on the defendant, the court may further
secure the latter by means of a conditional decree or
require giving of security. 17
Although the rule of mutuality of remedy has been
said to be dead, its ghost still occasionally appears to
haunt
unfortunate
plaintiffs,
either
as an application
to a case
where the doctrine,
if
true,
should
apply, 18 or
as a misapplication
of
some other
rule
of
law. 19 Sometimes the rule is given as a ground for a decision which
is properly based on other reasons. 20
14 -Williston on Contracts, Vol. 5, Revised Edition, Section 1440;

Walsh on Equity, Page 354.

15 -See Daniels v. Brown Shoe Co., 77 F. 2d, 899.
16 -See, for example, Zelleken v.
Water Co., 252 F. 762.

Lynch, supra, Note 4; City of La Follette v. La Follette

17 -Williston on Contracts, supra, Note 14.
18 -Wilson v. Nelson, 130 Neb. 1; Ten Eyck v. Manning,

52 N.J.

Eq. 47.

19 -See Ulrey v. Keith, 237 Ill. 284, where the court misapplied the rule that, where the
defendant can terminate the contract at will, specific performance will be denied, to
a case where .the plaintiff had such powers, giving as a ground for denying Apecific
performance the lack of mutuality.
20 -See the early English case of Flight v. Bolland, 1828, supra, Note L

The requirement of mutuality of remedy as a condition of specific relief in equity is also embalmed in
21
to wit, in Alabama, California,
in five states,
statutes
Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
The California
doctrine of mutuality is so thoroughly discussed in an
article
in 28 Calif.
L.R. 492 that
further
treatment here
would appear useless.

II.

MUTUALITY AS A REASON FOR GRANTING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE

For some obscure reason, either
as a corollary
to
Fry's rule of "Negative Mutuality", or as a misinterpretation of certain classes of cases, a rule of "positive
mutuality" came to be spawned on the courts.
The usual
statement of this
rule was that,
if,
(in
a hypothetical
converse case),
the defendant would be entitled
to specific performance of plaintiff's
part
of the contract,
apart from the mutuality doctrine, then the plaintiff
should also be given that remedy against the defendant,
on the principle
of mutuality.
Here again nothing is
said of the adequacy of the
plaintiff's
remedy at law.
If
the remedy of damages
would be adequate compensation to the plaintiff for the
defendant's breach of the contract, then there is no
particular reason to give the plaintiff a recovery in
specie.
If the plaintiff's legal relief would not be
adequate, that fact alone is generally a sufficient
basis for equitable jurisdiction, unless practical consideration preclude the remedy of specific performance.
In the latter
situation,
the doctrine of mutuality will
not, any more than the inadequacy of the legal remedy,
be of aid to a plaintiff.
The mutuality rule, when applied as a reason for granting specific relief, at least
works no

great

harm in

a

case where the plaintiff has

what is
generally held to be an adequate remedy at law,
but nevertheless considers specific performance the
better
remedy under the circumstances, and where there
are no other positive
reasons for denying equitable relief.
Almost

all

the cases

stating

the positive

mutuality

21 - Civil Code Section 3386 provides:
"Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has performed,
or is compellable specifically to perform, everything to which the former is
entitled, either completely, or nearly so, together with full compensation for
any want of entire performance. " See also Civil Code Section 3423(5).

rule, or discussing it, involve executory contracts for
the purwhere the vendor is
suing
for
the sale
of
land
chase price,
that
is,
for
specific
performance of
the
contract.
The formulation of the rule apparently arose
from a misunderstanding of the reason for allowing the
vendor to recover in such cases.
The true basis for the
decisions in this class of cases, as emphasized by most
modern cases
dealing
with the subject,
22 is
that
the
vendor of
land,
where the contract
remains largely
executory on both sides, does not have an adequate remedy
at law.
The seller's damages are measured by the difference between the value of the land and its purchase
price under the contract.
Since land usually has no
established market value, in most cases it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the vendor to prove
his loss accurately.
Furthermore, he would be required
to carry the land contracted to be sold, paying taxes
on it and maintaining it until he could find another
buyer.
That this is the real reason for allowing the
vendor to specifically
enforce
the agreement is
further
illustrated by decisions like that in Porter v Frenchman's Bay Co.,
84 Mo. 195,
wherein a demurrer to the
complaint was sustained because the inadequacy of the
available legal remedy of the seller was not alleged.
If mutuality of remedy is the reason for giving specific performance to the vendor, then there should be no
necessity for such an allegation.
Another example showing the ground for equitable jurisdiction in such cases
is
afforded
by the
situation
where the
contract
for
the
sale
of
land
is
no long4r
executory.
If
the seller has
fully
performed,
and nothing
further
remains to be done
under the
contract
other
than the
vendee's
payment of
the purchase
price,
Then the vendor is
entitled
to that
amount in an action at law and is not limited to his
damages for
breach
of
contract.
In such a case, it is
held that, since the seller may recover the same amount
at law as in equity, his remedy at law is adequate and
28
should be denied.
jurisdiction
equity
For the same reason-inadequacy of the legal remedy - the seller of a unique chattel, like the buyer
thereof,
may have specific
enforcement of
the contract
of sale. 24 By hypothesis, such personalty has no market
22 - Hodges v Kowing, 58 Conn. 12 Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N.H. 248; Baker Machine Co.
v. U. S. Fire Apparatus Co., 11 Del Cn. 386.
For further reference, see Walsh on

Equity, Page 341; Williston on Contracts, Vol. 5, Revised Edition, Section 1443;
Restatement of Contracts, Section 372(2).

23 - Jones v. Newhall, 155 Mass. 244.
24 - See Walsh on Equity, Page 342.

establishvalue,
and the vendor would have no means of
But it must be clearly shown that the
ing his damages.
legal relief is inadequate, in order to obtain equitable
intervention,, for mutuality of remedy is generally held
to afford
no reason
for
granting
specific
performance
of
the
contract
for
sale
of
personal
property
at
the
suit
of the
seller,
any more than it
does for
decreeing
speci25
fic
enforcement of
an agreement to sell
realty.
The
Uniform Sales Act, Section 63(3),
modifies
the
ordinary
rule
by allowing
the seller
to recover
the
purchase
price,
in
what would correspond
to an action
at
law, in
cases
where the goods are not readily resaleable.
If
this
section
is
applied,
then the
vendor has an adequate legal
remedy,
and equity
jurisdiction
should
probably
be denied,
unless
the
doctrine
is
accepted
that
equity,
once having
established
jurisdiction
over a certain
class
of
cases,
never relinquishes
it.
In summary, it is generally held that the fact
that the defendant could have had the contract specifically enforced against the plaintiff, if the plain-tiff
had refused
to perform, is
not
of
itself
a sufficient
reason to grant specific performance to the plaintiff.
Although a few courts have used the mutuality doctrine
as a supplementary reason for giving specific relief, 26
No cases have been found where that was the sole reason
for the decision.
In the field of specific performance,
as well as in other fields of equity jurisprudence, the
fundamental requirement of equitable intervention is the
lack of an adequate remedy at law on the part of the
plaintiff, and the purpose of equity is to provide such
a remedy.

25 - Eckstein v. Downing, supra, Note 22.
26 - Eastern Counties Ry. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H.L.C. 331,

(1885).

